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We investigate the effect of nonlinear redistributive drifts on the dynamics of wealth described
by a Fokker-Planck equation for the probability density function P (w, t) of wealth w at time t.
We consider (i) a piecewise linear tax, exempting those with wealth below a threshold w0, and
taxing the excess wealth with given rate, otherwise, and (ii) a power-law tax with exponent α > 0
(hence, progressive for α > 1 and regressive otherwise). In all cases, the collected amount of
wealth is redistributed equally. We analyze how these rules modify the distribution of wealth
across the population and, mainly, the inequality level measured through the Gini coefficient G.
The introduction of an exemption threshold not always diminishes inequality, depending on the
implementation details. Moreover, nonlinearity brings new stylized facts in comparison to the liner
case, e.g., negative skewness, bimodal P (w, t) indicating stratification, or a flat shape meaning
equality populated wealth layers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The tools of statistical mechanics to tackle out-of-
equilibrium processes can be useful to describe the dy-
namics of wealth [1]. The so-called random asset ex-
change models [2, 3], assuming wealth transfers through
pairwise interactions between agents, have successfully
shown the endogenous emergence of stylized facts of real
wealth distributions such as the concentration of wealth
in heavy tails and the formation of a condensed layer of
the poorest people [4, 5]. In fact, rich-get-richer mech-
anisms can lead to the continuous accumulation of as-
sets, accentuating wealth inequality, as observed in most
countries over time [6–8]. Therefore, the effects of reg-
ulatory processes capable of counteracting or mitigating
these trends are worth of investigation. With this aim,
agent based [9, 10] or probabilistic approaches [11] have
been considered. Alternatively, the Fokker-Planck ap-
proach is the natural counterpart of the stochastic dy-
namics describing asset random exchange trading. Bruce
Boghosian [12, 13] derived an equation for the time evo-
lution of the probability density of wealth P (w) that
emerges from the so-called yard-sale random transfers of
wealth, in which a fraction of a donor wealth is trans-
ferred to another agent [14]. In this model individuals
in an artificial society possess a certain wealth and par-
ticipate in transactions by pairs, such that the total net
worth W , as well as the size of the population N , are
conserved quantities, setting up a closed system. The
impact of linear redistributive actions in such a closed
economy has been addressed before [12, 13, 15–17]. Now,
we consider nonlinear redistributive taxes, which can be
regressive, progressive, or exempting the poorest popula-
tion, and investigate how they can contribute to reduce
the level of inequality.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Sec. II, we describe the Fokker-Planck model
with nonlinear drift and different settings that appear
concomitantly. In Sec. III, we present numerical results
for the stationary states and also for the evolution of
wealth distribution, comparing the effect of the different
tax protocols, through the Gini index. Final remarks are
presented in Sec. IV.
II. FOKKER-PLANCK DESCRIPTION
The stochastic dynamics of yard-sale exchanges with
taxes can be described, under certain approxima-
tions [12], through an integro-differential Fokker-Planck
equation (FPE) for the probability density function
(PDF) of wealth, P (w, t), namely
∂P
∂t
=
1
2
∂2
∂w2
([
w2A+B
]
P
)
− ∂
∂w
(
fP
)
, (1)
with
A ≡ A(w, t) =
∫ ∞
w
P (x, t)dx , (2)
B ≡ B(w, t) =
∫ w
0
x2P (x, t)dx . (3)
The first term in the right-hand side of Eq. (1) can be
interpreted as a state-dependent diffusive spreading of
wealth, which has its origin in the microscopic random
exchanges between agents. In the second term, the drift
f(w) represents the net gain (loss) of agents with wealth
w. The derivation of this FPE with linear f(w) can be
found in Ref. [12]. Now we assume that f(w) is given by
f(w) = χ
(
βw¯ − γg(w)) , (4)
where γg(w) is the wealth raised from agents possessing
w, through a nonlinear function g(w) times γ, a coef-
ficient that can be time dependent, whereas βw¯ is the
wealth received back (the same for all people), propor-
tional to the average per capita
w¯ =
∫ ∞
0
xP (x, t)dx , (5)
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2via a coefficient β that can also be time dependent, and
finally χ controls the relative strength of the drift per
unit time with respect to the diffusive process.
If χ = 0, the PDF P (w, t) continuously evolves accen-
tuating the condensation at w = 0 and the heavy Pareto
power-law tail when w gets large [12], respectively mean-
ing increase of the population at extreme poverty and
concentration of wealth among a small number of peo-
ple (oligarchy). This endless process that accentuates
inequality can be broken by the flow of wealth from the
richest to the poorest people, produced by the drift that
is present when χ > 0.
In the original version of the model, β = γ = 1 and
g(w) = w [12, 15], meaning time-independent taxes pro-
portional to individual wealth. We generalize the origi-
nally linear drift in Eq. (4), by considering different ker-
nels g(w) that are nonlinear (non proportional to w).
One of them is the piecewise-linear function
g(w) = (w − w0)H(w − w0), (6)
where w0 is a positive constant, H is the step Heaviside
function. The original version is recovered by setting
w0 = 0 and β = γ = 1, in which case fees are proportional
to the individual wealth no matter how small it is. We
also consider the power-law taxation
g(w) = wα, (7)
with α > 0. The taxation can be super-linear, i.e., pro-
gressive (α > 1), or sub-linear, i.e., regressive (0 < α <
1). This protocol also includes the original case, recov-
ered when β = γ = α = 1.
Besides the specific shape of the kernel g(x), there is
another issue that must be addressed concomitantly with
the drift nonlinearity. In all the analyzed cases, Eq. (1)
conserves the norm of P (w, t) along time. It means con-
servation of the population size N , whose distribution
within the full range of wealth is given by NP (w, t).
However, while in the linear case Eq. (1) naturally con-
serves the average wealth w¯ given by Eq. (5), otherwise
wealth conservation must be imposed through the evolu-
tion of the drift coefficients in Eq. (4). This is important
if we want to maintain the condition of a closed economy,
where the total wealth W = Nw¯ is conserved over time,
without losses or accumulation, for instance, by the regu-
latory agency. We can let γ evolve in time, which means
an adjustment of the protocol (setting I), or vary β (set-
ting II), meaning a fixed protocol but variable retrieved
wealth. Both cases and their connections are considered
in the next section.
III. PDF EVOLUTION AND STEADY STATE
SOLUTION
As previously shown [12], in the absence of regulation
(χ = 0), Eq. (1) leads to progressive condensation to-
wards w = 0, and a heavy tail for large w develops, with-
out actually reaching a normalizable steady state. The
inclusion of the drift with χ > 0 allows attaining a steady
solution, in all the cases considered. In order to follow
the time evolution of the wealth PDF, we numerically
solved Eq. (1) though a standard forward-time centered-
space scheme. Further details are shown in Appendix A.
Alternatively, to obtain the steady state solution, we di-
rectly solved the stationary FPE, that is, setting the time
derivative in Eq. (1) equal to zero, as described in Ap-
pendix B. Indeed, this solution coincides with the long-
time solution of the FPE. In all numerical examples, we
set w¯ = 1, without loss of generality, since it is equivalent
to performing the change of variables w/w¯ → w.
For both families of kernels g(w), we develop in
Secs. III A and III B, the setting I: fixing β = 1 and ad-
justing γ selfconsistently. Setting II (adjustable β and
γ = 1) is discussed in Sec. III C, where we show how the
steady states in both settings are related.
Finally, the wealth PDFs are characterized in terms of
a widely used inequality indicator, the Gini coefficient,
which can be estimated as [15],
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FIG. 1: Evolution of the wealth PDF with piecewise-
linear drift, for values of χ and w0 indicated in the legends,
at times increasing (from lighter to darker) from t = 0 to
t = 2 at each ∆t = 0.1, and from t = 2 to t = 5 at each
∆t = 0.5. The solution of the stationary FPE is also plotted
(green dashed line).
3G(t) = 1− 2
w¯
∫ ∞
0
xP (x, t)A(x, t)dx . (8)
A. Piecewise-linear tax with exemption limit w0
The evolution of P (w, t), under the taxation ruled by
the piecewise linear kernel defined in Eq. (6), is shown
in Fig. 1 for different values of χ and w0, starting from
an initial condition that results from the driftless evolu-
tion, at a time where the Gini index is G ' 0.59. In
all cases, increasing χ makes the final state less spread.
The condensation at w = 0 is suppressed, meaning the
absence of a majority at extreme poverty, and the heavy
tail for large w becomes restricted by a cutoff, reducing
large fortunes and oligarchy. In Fig. 1a, for w0 = 0.5, we
find a picture qualitatively similar to that of the linear
case [12], where the PDF has a positive skewness. Rais-
ing the threshold w0, the PDF can become almost flat
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FIG. 2: Stationary wealth PDF, with piecewise-linear
drift, for fixed χ according to the legend, and different values
of w0 varying (from light to dark lines) at each ∆w0 = 0.1
from 0.0 up to the limiting value w0 '2.5 (a), 1.7 (b) and 1.1
(c). Inset: same data in log-log scale to exhibit the cut-offs.
(see Fig. 1b), meaning uniformly populated wealth lay-
ers. For even larger w0, the skewness is inverted at long
times, with a mode larger than the average value w¯ = 1
(e.g., Fig. 1c). These are new features introduced by the
piecewise function. The evolution of the Gini index and
further details are shown in Appendix A.
The stationary PDFs for fixed χ and a large set of val-
ues of w0 are shown in Fig. 2. Increasing the rate χ nar-
rows the PDF around the mean, particularly, the cut-off
at low w is shifted such that wider ranges of poverty are
eliminated. This behavior is also observed in the linear
case and is not noticeably affected by w0 [15]. The ex-
emption threshold w0 affects more strongly the interme-
diate and large-w layers. The PDF can become bimodal
(e.g, Fig. 2b), indicating classes with defined asset level,
but scales are not well separated. The change of skewe-
ness can be observed in these plots for not too small χ
(Figs. 2b-c). Moreover, in general, raising the threshold
w0 leads to a more effective cut-off such that assets that
surpass that level tend to be suppressed. This is due to
the flow of wealth above w0 towards the population with
lower assets, depopulating the large-w tail.
The long-time value Gs of the Gini index is shown for
different values of χ in Fig. 3a. It decreases by raising w0,
as expected, however, a finite minimal level is attained
at a limiting value of w0. The larger is χ, the more
sensitive is Gs to w0. We have considered the full range
of values for completeness, although some intervals of
the parameters may be unrealistic. For instance, at the
limiting value of w0, the slope γs becomes divergent, to
keep the average w¯ fixed (see Appendix A), and the PDF
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FIG. 3: (a) Stationary Gini index for different values of
χ as a function of w0. (b) Mode of the wealth PDF (filled
symbols) vs. w0. The second maximum, when it exists, is
also plotted (hollow symbols). Lines are a guide to the eye.
4becomes truncated as can be observed in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3b, we plot the mode, wmax (filled symbols), as
well as the second maximum (hollow symbols) whenever
it exists. For low values of χ, the mode is weakly sensitive
to w0 and remains below w¯ (e.g., case χ = 0.2), producing
positively skewed distributions. For larger χ, the mode is
shifted towards the line wmax = w0, and can exceed the
mean value w¯ (unity, in our examples). When a second
peak at larger w develops (which occurs for not too large
χ), it can become the mode as w0 increases (e.g., for
χ = 0.5 in Fig. 3b, and also see Fig. 2b).
B. Power-law taxation
Stationary PDFs for different values of α and χ are ex-
hibited in Fig. 4. As in the piecewise-linear case, there is
a narrowing of the PDF with increasing χ. Flat, bimodal,
and negatively skewed PDFs can also emerge when α > 1,
but the PDF shapes are smoother for the power-law ker-
nel and the cutoffs less sharp.
0 1 2 3 4 5
w
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
s(
w
)
10−1 100
10−8
10−5
10−2
101
(a) χ = 0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
w
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
P
s(
w
)
10−1 100
10−8
10−5
10−2
101
(b) χ = 4.0
FIG. 4: Stationary wealth PDF, for power-law drift,
Ps(w), for different values of α at each ∆α = 0.1 for α ∈
[0.5, 0.9], and ∆α = 1 for α ∈ [1, 10], with values of χ accord-
ing to the legend. Inset: same data in log-log scale to show
the cutoff.
The stationary values of index G vs. α, for fixed values
of χ, are presented in Fig. 5a. When comparing these
curves with the respective ones of the piecewise-linear
case in Fig. 3a, we notice a matching for α ' 4w0 &
1. While the progressive taxation with α > 1 emulates
better the tax with exemption threshold w0, we find the
main differences for α < 1, due to its regressive character.
In the limit α → 0, due to the requirement of wealth
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FIG. 5: (a) Stationary Gini index for different values of
χ as a function of α. (b) Mode of the stationary wealth
PDF (filled symbols) vs. α. The second maximum, when it
exists, is also plotted (hollow symbols). Full lines are a guide
to the eye.
conservation, from Eq. (1), we have∫ ∞
0
wP (w, t)dw = γ
∫ ∞
0
P (w, t)dw , (9)
yielding constant γ = w¯. Then
f(w) = χ(w¯ − γ) = 0⇒ ∂
∂w
[fP ] = 0 , (10)
implying that the FPE drift term goes to zero when α→
0. Therefore, the dynamics evolves towards condensation
and long tails. Even though, the sublinear kernel does
produce relatively low values of the Gini index for large
enough χ. In fact, Gs rapidly decreases with α in the
regressive case. With regard to the maxima shown in
Fig. 5, the mode overcomes the average w¯ and a second
maximum can appear only for very large values of the
exponent α.
C. Setting II
Up to now, we developed the setting I, fixing the
amount of wealth shared (by fixing β = 1) and adapting
the coefficient γ(t) to conserve the average wealth. Now,
we analyze setting II, where γ = 1 and β is adjusted.
The stationary solutions can be related by identifying
each drift terms in Eq. (4), yielding
βIIs = 1/γ
I
s
χII = χIγIs . (11)
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FIG. 6: Setting II: evolution for piece-wise linear
drift. (a) Wealth PDF (a), P (w, t) vs. w, with variable
β, for the same times used in Fig. 1. (b) Gini index vs. time
for settings I (black) and II (light green), with parameters
verifying Eqs. (11) leading to the same steady state).
As an illustration, we followed the evolution of case
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FIG. 7: Setting II: stationary wealth PDF with
piecewise-linear drift, for fixed χ according to the legend,
and different values of w0 varying (from light to dark lines)
at each ∆w0 = 0.1 from 0.0 up to 1.0 in (a) and from 0.0 up
to 0.9 in (b). Inset: same data in log-log scale to exhibit the
cut-offs.
II, with parameters that verify the above relations with
respect to setting I in Fig. 1b. In fact, the steady state
coincide (compare Figs. 1b and 6a). However, the tempo-
ral evolution differs, as can be also observed by following
the Gini indexes over time, in Fig. 6b. The steady state
is reached faster within setting II.
In contrast to setting I, where increasing the thresh-
old w0 reduces the inequality measured by Gs, in setting
II, a different dependence on w0 emerges, as shown in
Fig. 6b. The stationary value of the Gini index is rather
insensitive to w0 and even increases with w0. A high
threshold exempts people with lower level of wealth but
the collected wealth is smaller. Then it is better to re-
move the exemption. The corresponding steady PDFs
are presented in Fig. 7. For the power-law taxation, the
Gini index decreases with α (not shown).
Of course, in the limit w0 → 0 or α → 1, yielding the
linear case, both setting coincide.
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FIG. 8: Stationary Gini index for setting II as a func-
tion of w0. Lines are a guide to the eye.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Regulatory processes seem to be necessary to coun-
teract concentration trends. We studied nonlinear re-
distributive mechanisms that allow to reduce inequality.
Two families of taxation kernels were studied: piecewise
linear, with an exempting threshold, and power law. We
performed numerical integration of the FPE to follow the
time evolution of P (w, t), starting from a given initial
unequal distribution and also the stationary PDF Ps(w)
was directly obtained.
These studied tax protocols produce economic mobil-
ity against the natural trend towards the condensation at
w = 0 that occurs in the regulation-free case. The nonlin-
earity brings new features with respect to the linear case,
allowing to achieve greater social equality. Moreover, dis-
tributions with peculiar stylized facts can emerge. For
moderate values of the control parameters, distributions
can be bimodal, which indicates the stratification and
coexistence of the population in economic classes with
distinct characteristic asset levels. A flat profile can also
emerge, and, for strong regulation, the skewness of the
6wealth PDF changes sign. We also discussed the similar-
ities and differences between two settings, where either
the collected or the divided wealth coefficients are ad-
justed. Depending on the adjustment made, a higher
exemption threshold w0 can be detrimental for equality.
Let us also remark that the results can be translated
to those of arbitrary w¯ by a simple scaling. In fact,
from Eq. (1), we have P (w, t; w¯) = P (w/w¯, t; 1)/w¯, to-
gether with the identifications: w0(1) = w0(w¯)/w¯ (and
γ unchanged) in the piecewise-linear case, and γ(1) =
γ(w¯)w¯α−1 in the power-law case.
As a perspective for future work, it would be inter-
esting to study the underlying agent exchange dynamics,
the effect of redistribution applied at discrete time steps,
the combination of a power-law kernel with exemption
threshold w0, and also the impact of the spatial dimen-
sion [18] going beyond the mean-field approximation.
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Appendix A: Numerical integration of the FPE
In order to obtain the solution of Eq. (1) numerically,
we performed the change of variables
w = − ln(1− y), (A1)
that univocally maps the interval [0,+∞) into the inter-
val [0, 1] [15]. With this change, Eqs. (2)-(5) become
A(y, t) =
∫ ∞
y
P (w(x), t)
1− x dx , (A2)
B(y, t) =
∫ y
0
ln2(1− x)
1− x P (w(x), t)dx , (A3)
f(y, t) = χ
(
βw¯ − γg(w(y))
)
, (A4)
w¯ = −
∫ 1
0
ln(1− y)
(1− y) P (w(y), t)dy . (A5)
Additionally, the normalization condition, meaning con-
servation of the population size, becomes∫ 1
0
P (w(y), t)
1− y dy = 1. (A6)
Then, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
∂P
∂t
+(1−y)∂C
∂y
= (1−y)
{
(1− y)∂
2D
∂y2
− ∂D
∂y
}
, (A7)
where C and D are
C ≡ C(y, t) = f(y, t)P , (A8)
D ≡ D(y, t) = 1
2
(
ln2(1− y)A+B)P . (A9)
7Equation (A7) was integrated using a standard
forward-time centered-space algorithm.
In setting I, β = 1 and γ evolves satisfying
γ(t)
∫ ∞
0
g(w)P (w, t)dw = w¯ , (A10)
which means conservation of the total wealth owned by
the individuals (or average wealth per individual, since
the population size is conserved).
In setting II, γ = 1 and β is ruled by
β(t)w¯ =
∫ ∞
0
g(w)P (w, t)dw . (A11)
For the piecewise-linear case, the time evolution of γ
within setting I is shown in Fig. 3a, and that of the
Gini index in Fig. 3b. In the absence of regulation
(χ = 0), condensation would proceed, leading to dra-
matic inequality, with the Gini index monotonically in-
creasing. Differently, for χ > 0, the Gini index stabilizes.
Depending on the initial condition, this stabilization can
occur from below (e.g., for χ = 0.05), or moving far from
the condensed state towards a more fair distribution of
wealth for large enough χ. While the initial rate of de-
crease depends on χ, the final stabilization value is ruled
by w0 too. Of course, for an initial PDF with sharp cutoff
below w0, the drift with be ineffective.
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FIG. 9: (a) Time evolution of γ, from the numerical inte-
gration of FPE (1), for the values of χ and w0 of Fig. 9. The
long-time value of γ is in good agreement with that obtained
by direct integration of the stationary FPE. (b) Evolution of
the Gini index G(t). Dotted lines indicate the steady state
values. The computational cost increases when reaching the
drift-less limit χ = 0.
Appendix B: Direct integration of the steady FPE
In the particular case of the linear rule g(w) = w,
recovered for w0 = 0 or α = 1, we have β = γ = 1,
independently of the value that χ > 0 assumes, and also
independently of time, hence the stationary value is γs =
1 (or βs = 1).
Otherwise, the stationary value γs was obtained self-
consistently from the integration of the stationary form
of the FPE (1), which for no flux boundary conditions
reads
1
2
µ′ − fP = 0 , (B1)
where µ ≡ µ(w) = (w2A+ B)P (w) and “′” mean differ-
entiation with respect to w.
In order to solve this equation, we generalized the nu-
merical procedure described in Ref. [15]. It consists in
splitting Eq. (B1) into the following coupled linear dif-
ferential equations, namely,
A′ = −P = −µ/(w2A+B), (B2)
B′ = w2P = w2µ/(w2A+B), (B3)
µ′ = = 2fP = 2fµ/(w2A+B), (B4)
with the initial conditions A(0) = 1, B(0) = µ(0) =
0, together with the normalization condition, namely,
A0 = limw→∞A(w) = 0. This integration however is
not straightforward due to the singular behavior of P (w)
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FIG. 10: Stationary value of γ as a function of w0 (a) and α
(b), for different values of χ indicated in the legend. In (a),
the vertical dotted lines indicate the asymptote. In (b), the
inset is a zoom of the vicinity of the origin. Full lines are a
guide to the eye.
8near the origin, that behaves as
P (w) ' C
w2
exp
(
2
∫ w f(x)
x2
dx
)
, (B5)
where C is a constant. Then, we use the final value
in the interval (0, δw), with δw  1 as initial con-
dition for the set of differential equations (B2)-(B4).
But still, this initial condition depends on C, which
must be determined from the normalization constraint
A0 = limw→∞A(w) = 0. From the plot of A0(C) vs.
C, using a Newton-Raphson (NR) procedure, C can be
determined by solving A(C) = 0, which has a single root.
This is, essentially, the procedure described before for the
linear case [15]. In the nonlinear case, we must still de-
termine the value of γs (in setting I) or βs (in setting II)
that defines f(w), under the constraint of conservation
of the average wealth w¯. Then, a second NR procedure
is required to find the correct value of γs or βs for each
value of C that enters in the first NR scheme. (Actu-
ally in numerical integration, we also use the change of
variables given by Eq. (A1).) The steady solutions Ps(w)
found through this procedure are in accurate agreement
with the long-time solutions obtained by numerical inte-
gration of the time-dependent FPE, as illustrated in the
insets of Figs. 1 and 7.
For fixed β = 1 (setting I), the stationary value of γs is
plotted in Fig. 10, for given values of χ, as a function of
w0 (a) and α (b). In case (a), γs increases from unity at
w0 = 0 (pure linear case) diverging at a finite value w0c
(indicated by dotted vertical lines), following the scaling
γs ∼ (w0c − w0)−2. This divergence implies a trunca-
tion of the PDF at the critical value w0c, as observed in
Fig. 4. For the power-law rule, the coefficient γ plays
a different role. The curves first increase from γs = 1,
up to a maximal value, and then decay exponentially to-
wards zero. Notice that when, α = 1 (pure linear case),
γs = 1. When α = 0, from Eq. (10), we have γ = w¯
(= 1 in our examples). As a consequence the drift term
with redistributive mechanism vanishes, then we recover
the dynamics without tax regulation when the system
becomes at long time an oligarchy of wealthy people con-
comitantly with a condensed phase of the very poor ones
(see inset of Fig. 10). The computational cost increases
when reaching the drift-less limit.
